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Economists have long been interested in how persistent the eﬀects of
short-term unexpected shocks in the labor market are on workers’ careers
(e.g., Okun 1973). Using newly available longitudinal data, an increasing
number of papers suggest that the starting conditions in the ﬁrst year of a
worker’s job or labor market entry can indeed have long-term eﬀects on
earnings and career development (e.g., Oreopoulos, von Wachter, Heisz
2006; Oyer 2006; Kahn 2006). For example, Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and
Heisz (2006) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of graduating college in a recession fades
after ten years for the typical worker and has permanent negative eﬀects
for less-able graduates. While clearly a concern for policymakers and the
public, such lasting eﬀects of entry conditions are also diﬃcult to explain
in the context of standard models of wage setting and career development.
In particular, they raise the question of whether wages persistently deviate
from workers’ skills because of market frictions or wage contracts.
This question has received particular attention in the context of cohort
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0453017. All errors are our own.eﬀects within ﬁrms. A small but inﬂuential number of papers have argued
that similar workers entering ﬁrms in diﬀerent years receive permanently
diﬀerent wage proﬁles (Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994; Beaudry and
DiNardo 1991). Several approaches have been proposed to rationalize
such persistent shifts in ﬁrms’ wage structures. The ﬁrst maintains that the
degree of rent sharing between workers and ﬁrms varies with outside mar-
ket conditions at the time of entry (Beaudry and DiNardo 1991). The sec-
ond maintains that cohort eﬀects arise from variation in the quality of jobs
and career opportunities available within the ﬁrm (Okun 1973). If diﬀerent
jobs provide diﬀerent general experience or training provided by the ﬁrm,
cohort eﬀects can also arise from permanent changes in workers’ skills
(Gibbons and Waldman 2004).
Although these explanations have very diﬀerent underlying views of
wage determination, they have similar predictions for the degree of per-
sistence of entry-level conditions. Thus, it is diﬃcult to distinguish among
them based on cohort eﬀects in earnings alone. However, these explana-
tions have alternative implications for the persistence of entry-level condi-
tions as workers switch employers. While eﬀects due to rent sharing or job
quality should fade for those workers losing their jobs, changes in skills
should aﬀect workers’ wages even at new employers. Despite oﬀering clear
predictions, these hypotheses have not been tested, in part because data
used in existing work had little information on workers’ job mobility and
their employers.
More generally, because existing studies focused on single ﬁrms (Baker,
Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994) or particular time periods (Beaudry and Di-
Nardo 1991), at present little is known about whether ﬁrm-entry cohort
eﬀects are a pervasive phenomenon in the wider labor market. Given the
degree of heterogeneity in other aspects of ﬁrms’ wage structures (Abowd
and Kramarz 1999) and given the amount of heterogeneity in ﬁrm growth
rates (Davis and Haltiwanger 1992), it is conceivable that ﬁrm-entry cohort
eﬀects are a widespread phenomenon that aﬀects ﬁrms to diﬀerent de-
grees. However, until now little information is available on how pervasive
such cohort eﬀects are.
In this chapter, we provide three contributions to the present literature.
First, we use data on the complete career histories of all workers in a large
German manufacturing sector to describe the prevalence and heterogene-
ity of ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects for a large sample of ﬁrms over more than
twenty years. To ensure the cohort diﬀerences in wages we ﬁnd are not due
to selective entry of workers into ﬁrms, the nature of our data allows us to
control for observable ﬁrm and worker characteristics as well as worker
ﬁxed eﬀects. In addition, the long time horizon allows us to examine
whether entry conditions fade within ﬁrms and whether ﬁrms’ wages tend
to converge to a common market wage over time.
Second, we exploit the predictions of the alternative models for the im-
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hort eﬀects. To do so, we complement the descriptive analysis with a study
of the eﬀects of job displacement on wage changes for workers with high,
medium, or low starting wages at the lost job. Thereby, we are particularly
interested in whether wage premiums fade upon job loss and whether
workers recover some of their past advantages with time since job loss.
Third, we analyze the eﬀect of past wage premiums on the level of wages
after job loss. Because controlling for observable characteristics past wages
are partly a function of unobserved ability, we would expect a positive cor-
relation. However, if the ability of job losers is not observed perfectly by the
market, temporary wage premiums may also serve as a temporary signal
that fades over time. If, on the other hand, wage premiums are driven by
permanent skill diﬀerences, we would expect their eﬀect to be stable or in-
creasing.
We ﬁnd that in the manufacturing sector we study, ﬁrm-entry cohort
eﬀects are a signiﬁcant phenomenon. Similar ﬁrms pay diﬀerent wages to
similar workers starting their jobs at diﬀerent points in time. However, we
also ﬁnd that this is not simply a homogeneous market-wide phenome-
non—there is considerable heterogeneity between ﬁrms and between co-
horts in the incidence and strength of cohort eﬀects. A further key result is
that in our sample, entry-level diﬀerences in wages fade within ﬁrms, and
there appears convergence to a market wage, but reversion is very slow.
Thus, wage diﬀerences between cohorts of similar workers are highly per-
sistent but not permanent.
We also ﬁnd that workers with high starting wages have higher and per-
sistent wage losses at job loss; workers with relatively low starting wages,
on the other hand, seem to gain from losing their job. Thus, part of initial
wage diﬀerences appears to be temporary ﬁrm-speciﬁc rents. Moreover,
there appears to be mean reversion at job loss. However, markets do not
seem to be able to fully tell apart ability from rents in the short run, and
past wage advantages carry a premium for the level of wage after job loss
that fades over time.
These results suggest that ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects at least in part con-
sist of time varying diﬀerences in rent sharing or job quality. Clearly, part
of the eﬀects we ﬁnd may also arise due to the presence of other individual
speciﬁc rents, for example, from job search. Future research based on a
larger sample of ﬁrms and workers able to explicitly analyze the persistence
of cohort eﬀects at job loss will help to shed light on this question. The re-
sults also suggest that characteristics of the previous job, such as job tenure
or past wages, are not just a ﬁxed measure of worker quality, as suggested
in the prior literature (e.g., Kletzer 1989) but also appear to inﬂuence tem-
porary wage components. Among others, this could arise if previous job
characteristics aﬀect workers’ reservation wages. The eﬀect of these ini-
tial conditions fades, consistent with the notion of continued on-the-job
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rary signals of workers’ skills.1
The outline of the chapter is as follows. First, we give a brief overview of
the conceptual background, the empirical approach, and the data we use.
Second, we describe the prevalence of cohort eﬀects in a sample of large and
stable manufacturing ﬁrms. Third, we analyze the eﬀect of past starting
wages on the extent of wage changes at job displacement. Fourth, we study
the eﬀect of the starting wage on the lost job on the level of ensuing wages.
The last section concludes and oﬀers suggestions for future research.
4.2 Conceptual Approach
There are two basic explanations for the persistence of diﬀerences in
starting wages of workers entering the same ﬁrm at diﬀerent moments in
time. The ﬁrst view suggests that wages contain ﬁrm-speciﬁc components
that can diﬀer across entry cohorts but that are lost as workers move be-
tween ﬁrms. This may arise due to diﬀerences in the degree of rent sharing
among workers and ﬁrms, for example, due to the degree of pressure in the
outside labor market. Or it may arise to the presence of long-term implicit
insurance contracts (Beaudry and DiNardo 1991). Alternatively, this may
be due to variation in the quality of jobs oﬀered within ﬁrms over time
(Okun 1973). For example, in periods of high growth, ﬁrms may oﬀer more
jobs that pay more, either because of higher productivity or due to higher
incentive wages. Persistent diﬀerences may also arise if some jobs provide
higher accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills.
These alternative sources of wage diﬀerentials have the similar implica-
tion that the wage advantages they may imply for certain cohorts are lost if
workers leave the ﬁrm. Because voluntary movers may not leave their job
if compensated for giving up of these wage premiums, the loss is likely to
be visible only for workers who move their job involuntarily. Thus, we
would expect wage losses for those job losers to be largest that had the
highest wage premiums. For these displaced workers, we would expect to
see mean reversion; that is, those workers with below-average cohort wages
experience wage gains relative to those workers with above-average cohort
wages as absent any skill diﬀerentials, both groups draw again wages from
the same market wage distribution.
Because the workers with below-average cohort wages could have ob-
tained higher wages on the outside market, some mobility friction must
prevent them from moving jobs. Because cohort eﬀects are likely to be
more typically in large ﬁrms with longer job attachment, this is likely to
arise due to the presence of average wage premiums large ﬁrms pay (Oi and
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1. However, in that case the eﬀect of the initial signal should not fade over time (Farber and
Gibbons 1996; Altonji and Pierret 2001).Idson 1999). Nevertheless, we would expect that on average workers with
below-average cohort wages are more like to switch employers. Similarly,
ﬁrms may face an incentive to ﬁre workers with above-average wages if
these are due to a higher amount of rents.
The second broad view suggests ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects arise from
changes in workers’ general skill level. This may occur if in some periods
ﬁrms oﬀer a larger amount of jobs with a high degree of experience accu-
mulation or general training (Gibbons and Waldman 2004). In this case,
diﬀerential entry-level conditions reﬂect actual diﬀerences in workers’ skill
levels and can arise even in an environment where each worker is paid his
marginal product. This is in contrast with the ﬁrst set of explanations, that
each suggested that workers with similar skills would be paid diﬀerent
wages, either because of rent sharing or diﬀerences in job quality.
Clearly, the second view suggests that even workers losing their job in-
voluntarily will maintain their wage advantage on their new job at least in
the medium run. While in the years immediately following the job loss some
of the advantage may be lost as workers have to ﬁnd a new job match or as
the market may be uncertain about workers’ ability, in the medium run,
workers should again obtain a wage that reﬂects their higher (or lower) mar-
ginal product. This stands in contrast to the implications of the ﬁrst view, in
which all cohort-wage diﬀerences should be lost at job loss. In particular,
even if past wages may serve as a positive signal for ability in the years im-
mediately after job loss, the eﬀect of past cohort conditions should fade
with time since job loss—the opposite implication as from the second view.
The existing empirical literature does not address the question of per-
sistence of conditions on the past job for workers switching employers. One
strand of literature aims at characterizing the presence of ﬁrm-entry cohort
eﬀects, but pays little attention as to what happens when workers leave
ﬁrms. In this vein, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994) analyze the role 
of cohort eﬀects within a single ﬁrm. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) use
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and Panel Study of In-
come Dynamics (PSID) to analyze the eﬀect of labor market conditions on
workers’ wages as they stay within the ﬁrm. Neither paper analyzes the per-
sistence of the wage eﬀect it ﬁnds as workers move between ﬁrms, mostly
due to a lack of data.
Another strand of literature examines the extent and determinants of
wage changes at job loss in detail, but typically pays less attention to the
role of past job characteristics.2The only important exception is the role of
past job tenure. Because there is no market for ﬁrm worker-speciﬁc skills
or match rents, the wage gradient with job tenure can be seen as a form of
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2. Past industry, occupation, and ﬁrm size are an exception. See, for example, Ruhm (1991).
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), Gibbons and Katz (1991), or Farber (1997, 2003).
For a survey of this literature, see Farber (1999).rent sharing between workers and ﬁrms. A worker losing his job should
then lose these ﬁrm-speciﬁc rents. This is what the literature has found, and
the eﬀect appears to be particularly strong for a loss in industry tenure
(Neal 1995; Parent 2000).
In this context, Kletzer (1989) has found that workers with higher past
job tenure have higher wages on the job after job loss. This may signify that
workers with high job tenure are also of high ability, that is, positive wage
tenure proﬁles in part reﬂect ability diﬀerences between high- and low-
tenured workers.3A similar argument holds for the eﬀect of the initial wage
on the lost job. Even conditional on observable characteristics—such as age
and education—past starting wages will be a function of unobserved worker
ability and will thus positively correlate with wages on the current job.
However, past tenure and earnings may also inﬂuence workers’ reserva-
tion wages. In this case, high past wages may lead workers to search for jobs
more intensely. If this is the case, there is again an initial correlation of past
job characteristics and initial earnings after layoﬀs. Over time, these work-
ers’ wages are again determined by market conditions (workers’ skill levels
and the overall wage distribution); thus, the eﬀect of the reservation wage
would be expected to fade.
In addition, if the market observes workers’ ability only imperfectly, it
may use past job tenure or past wages as signals to infer about their pro-
ductivity (Farber and Gibbons 1996; Altonji and Pierret 2001). In this case,
part of the positive eﬀect of past job tenure may be due to an initial signal-
ing eﬀect. However, this eﬀect should not fade over time, even if markets
learn about workers’ ability.
If, on the other hand, ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects are due to diﬀerential
skill accumulation, we should observe the opposite phenomenon. Initially,
some of the higher skills embodied in the cohort-eﬀect may be discounted
if displaced workers receive a wage based on average skills. Over time, as
markets learn about workers’ true ability, we would expect the eﬀect of past
wages to remain stable, or least not to decline further.
4.3 Empirical Approach
The analysis of the chapter consists of two parts, each based on a diﬀer-
ent sample of ﬁrms. The ﬁrst, descriptive part of the paper studies the im-
portance of ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects for a sample of large stable ﬁrms in
the car manufacturing sector in Germany. The second part analyzes wage
changes and wage levels of job losers using the complete available career
histories of all workers who ever worked in German car manufacturing.
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3. This idea is also exploited in Abraham and Farber (1987), who use completed job tenure
as an indicator for the quality of a job match to correct for selection bias in estimates of the
return to job tenure.The data is drawn from the German employee registry that records com-
plete career information as well as basic demographics for the universe of
German workers covered by social security and their employers from 1975
to 2003 and is further described in the following.
The goal of the ﬁrst part of the paper is to describe the incidence, het-
erogeneity, and persistence of ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects within a large but
speciﬁc sector of the economy. The focus on a single sector allows us to ex-
clude wage diﬀerences arising from diﬀerential industry trends or business
cycles. To study the magnitude and evolution of average cohort wages, we
concentrated our analysis on stable establishments with a large enough
rate of inﬂow of new workers in every period. For each of the ﬁfty-ﬁve ﬁrms
that survive our selection criteria further described in the following, we es-
timate cohort eﬀects following the approach in Baker, Gibbs, and Holm-
strom (1994). To do so, we proceed in three steps. First, we collapse our
data to the level of ﬁrm-tenure entry year cells. Second, we use the cell-level
averages to run the following wage regression at the ﬁrm level.
(1) l  o  g   w  fct    f   gf(ten)    ft    cf    fX  fct   ufct
This modeling approach allows for a ﬁrm-speciﬁc quartic tenure proﬁle
[gf(t)], a constant and year eﬀects, as well as for ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects of av-
erage entry cohort characteristics. Third, we regress the estimated ﬁrm-
entry cohort eﬀects ( cf) on a ﬁrm-speciﬁc trend and treat the residual
from that regression as cohort eﬀects for the remainder of our study. As ex-
plained in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994) in the presence of year and
tenure eﬀects, one cannot identify the linear component of the cohort
eﬀect. Because we are mainly interested in examining the presence and sig-
niﬁcance of cohort eﬀects, the chosen approach suﬃces for our purposes.
In addition to including average observable characteristics at the cohort
level, we also ran the model in equation (1) at the individual level and in-
cluded worker ﬁxed eﬀects. Unlike in the case of Baker, Gibbs, and Holm-
strom (1994), who only had access to data on all workers at a single ﬁrm,
this is possible in our case because we have the entire career information of
workers who ever worked at each of our ﬁrms. This further alleviates the
concern that the cohort eﬀects identiﬁed in equation (1) may still be due to
selective entry of workers of diﬀerent skill levels.
An important aspect of ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects is their persistence—
do diﬀerences in entry-level wages last unfettered forever, as found in the
ﬁrm analyzed by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), or does conver-
gence take place? Convergence may be of two kinds. First, high-wage co-
horts may converge to the average-wage level within the ﬁrm. In this case,
the relevant benchmark and speed of convergence is determined by the
ﬁrm-level average. Second, high-wage cohorts may converge to a market-
level wage. That is, reversion of high initial starting wages may be faster if
they are high relative to the overall market wage.
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we modify the preceding model and estimate the following regression for
each ﬁrm in our sample of large stable ﬁrms.
(2) l  o  g   w  fct    f   gf (ten)    ft    f X  fct    cf0   hf (ten) cf 1   ufct
Thereby,  cf 0 measures the diﬀerence in initial starting wages for entry co-
hort c, and  cf1measures the ﬁrm-speciﬁc rate of decay of the initial eﬀect.
We experimented with linear, quartic, and unrestricted speciﬁcations for
the decay function hf(t), and found a linear speciﬁcation works astonish-
ingly well for the most relevant time horizon of about ten years of job
tenure.
The second part of the paper studies the eﬀect of starting wages on the
eﬀect of job displacements. Once we have identiﬁed displacement events
and an appropriate estimation methodology, the analysis is relatively
straightforward. In particular, we are interested in whether wage losses at
job displacement diﬀer by the level of the starting wage at the previous 
job. Ideally, we would have analyzed the eﬀect of ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects
themselves on the extent of wage loss for workers losing their jobs from our
sample of large and stable ﬁrms. However, for the sector in question, the
sample of such workers was too small for a meaningful analysis.
Thus, in the second part of the paper, we analyze the eﬀect of a job dis-
placement on wage changes and post-job loss wage levels for all workers
who worked in German car manufacturing at some point between 1975
and 2003. We deﬁne a displaced worker to be a worker who had at least
three (or ﬁve) years of tenure at a given ﬁrm and who had at least thirty
days of unemployment following the job move. We experimented with al-
ternative deﬁnitions based on mass layoﬀs at the establishment level, but
again found that we had too few workers aﬀected by such events in our
sample.4
We then study the wage change of displaced workers relative to the wage
held prior to job loss for up to ﬁfteen years after the job change. Speciﬁ-
cally, the basic model we estimate at the individual level is




it  k   g(expit)    t   uit,
where the dummies Dik indicate whether a year is k periods before or af-
ter a job loss, and y stands for calendar year. This estimates the eﬀect of
wage changes at job loss controlling for a quartic polynomial in potential
labor market experience, unrestricted year eﬀects, and worker ﬁxed eﬀects.
This model essentially extends Farber’s estimates based on the Displaced
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4. In a separate work using the German Socio-Economic Panel, Görlitz and von Wachter
(2006) ﬁnd that while imposing unemployment does tend to raise the estimated impact of 
job losses relative to self-reported layoﬀ status, the diﬀerence is reduced signiﬁcantly when
worker ﬁxed eﬀects are included.Worker Survey (DWS) Supplement to the CPS into an analysis covering
several periods after the job loss. In particular, this approach does not keep
a control group of workers who did not lose their job, and thus diﬀers from
the estimation method implemented by Bender et al. (2002) for Germany,
based on Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993). Instead, the year eﬀects
in this sample are identiﬁed from the baseline period of workers later ex-
periencing displacement.5
The main estimates we are interested in are estimates of the earnings loss
by groups of workers with low, medium, and high starting wages relative to
their average wage. Thus, we reestimate the model in equation (3) interact-
ing the time eﬀect as well as the displacement-time eﬀects with dummies
for whether a worker’s starting wage at the lost job was in the bottom,
middle, or top of the wage distribution (we choose the interquartile range
as cutoﬀ points). This results in the following model for estimation:
















   t
Low    t
Medium    t
High   g(expit)   uit
The estimates of this model show the wage changes by groups of workers
with diﬀerent starting wages relative to their owngroup-speciﬁc wage at the
time of job loss.
In future work, we plan to include stayers—workers who did not lose
their job—in the model as a control group to replicate the classic event
study design introduced by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993). We
will also analyze wage losses by other worker characteristics such as edu-
cation, age, or past job tenure. Similarly, we can exploit further prediction
regarding the eﬀect of past job characteristics on the wage changes of vol-
untary movers.
The last set of models we estimate focus on the levelof log wages after job
loss. To do so, we begin by implementing the models estimated by Kletzer
(1989), who concentrates on the eﬀect of past job tenure. We ﬁrst augment
Kletzer’s model with the eﬀect of past starting wages. Then we extend her
approach and interact past job tenure and past starting wages with time
since job loss. Thus, we are interested in the coeﬃcients on the interactions
with time since job loss in the following model:
(5) log wit      0log wi0
LostJob    1 log wi0
LostJob    Xi
  g(expit)    t   εit,
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5. To identify the worker ﬁxed eﬀects, we have to exclude one pre-period dummy. To iden-
tify the year eﬀects, we have to exclude one additional dummy. Thus, we keep observations on
workers up to ﬁve years prior to displacement and include dummies for up to three years prior
to displacement.where   stands for the years since job loss. This model is only estimated
based on observations after a job loss. The important extension of Klet-
zer’s model is made possible by the availability of longer time series in our
data and allows us to study to what extent the immediate eﬀect of past job
and worker characteristics on wages post job loss fades over time. Alter-
natively, we will be able to see whether past wages are driven by compo-
nents of actual or predicted worker skill whose eﬀect stays stable.
4.4 Administrative Longitudinal Matched Data
The data used in this chapter are drawn from the German employment
register containing information on all employees covered by social secu-
rity, representing around 80 percent of the German workforce.6 The em-
ployment register takes stock of existing employees at each establishment
twice a year. Because the notiﬁcation procedure for social security also re-
quires employers to record any permanent or temporary change of em-
ployment relationships, the employment register contains detailed histo-
ries for each worker’s time in covered employment. The main information
contained in the register for administrative purposes (and, therefore, the
most reliable) are gross daily wages subject to social security contributions
and the exact periods during which the employee worked in the social se-
curity system. In addition, the data contain basic demographic informa-
tion as well as information on occupation, industry, job status, and educa-
tion.7 Most important for the present purpose, the data also contain
unique establishment identiﬁers. These were used to create a separate data
set of establishment characteristics that were aggregated up from the em-
ployment register and merged back onto the individual-level data. Char-
acteristics include, among others, establishment size, employment growth,
and average wages. The relevant entity throughout the empirical analysis
is the establishment. Despite the inaccuracy it entails in some cases, we will
keep using the terms establishment and ﬁrm interchangeably for the rest of
the analysis.8
The sample used for this chapter consists of information on the universe
of workers and establishments from the West German car-manufacturing
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6. An overview of the data is given in Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000); a more detailed de-
scription can be found in Bender et al. (1996). For further information and citations as well
as accessibility, see http://www.research-data-center.de. Coverage includes full- and part-time
employees of private enterprises, apprentices, and other trainees, as well as temporarily sus-
pended employment relationships. The self-employed, civil servants, and students are ex-
cluded.
7. The entity reporting is the establishment for which an employee works and can thus
change over time. This can lead to mistakes in the coding of some demographic variables (e.g.,
nationality or marital status) and in particular education (which tends to reﬂect required
rather than actual qualiﬁcation).
8. Unfortunately, it is currently not possible to link establishments that belong to a com-
mon parent ﬁrm.sector. In a ﬁrst step, we selected all employees who worked at least one day
between 1975 and 2003 in an establishment of this sector (a total of 162,332
establishments). To ensure that the sample is consistent in time, we chose
only those notiﬁcations where the employees worked part or full time. We
dropped apprentices from the main analysis to avoid confounding job
changes at end of apprenticeship with regular job displacement and to be
consistent with the concept of ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀect typically analyzed
in the literature. We also dropped workers with missing education and who
are younger than twenty-one and older than sixty-four.
Using this sample, we aggregated up the individual-level information
into a cell-level data set at the establishment, year, and entry cohort level
that contains the size of each entering cohort in each year at the ﬁrm, as
well as average earnings and basic average demographic characteristics
(such as average age, average education, or fraction female). To obtain a
meaningful basis for the descriptive analysis of ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects,
from this cell-level data set we extracted a subset of ﬁrms that had a suﬃ-
ciently large inﬂow of workers each year for an extended period of time. In
particular, we required ﬁrms to have at least ten entering cohorts with at
least ten employees, at least 100 employees over ten years, and at least
twenty-one entering cohorts. This leaves us with a total number of ﬁfty-ﬁve
ﬁrms. This restriction ensures both a reasonable sample of ﬁrms as well as
a meaningful base for calculation of a large number of ﬁrm-entry cohort
eﬀects. We have experimented with the cutoﬀ points, without a noticeable
diﬀerence in results. In addition, to ensure we observe each cohort for an
extended amount of time, we only consider cohorts entering before 1997.
For the displacement analysis, we selected from our sample of car man-
ufacturing all workers with at least three years of tenure who changed em-
ployers and who spend at least thirty days in unemployment after moving.
For this sample, we only kept observations that were at least ﬁve years be-
fore and at most ﬁfteen years after the job loss. Characteristics of various
samples of displaced workers are shown in table 4.1.
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Firm-Entry Cohort Eﬀects in German Car Manufacturing
To illustrate our main descriptive results, we begin by showing the pat-
tern of ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects for a single large and stable establishment
in the car manufacturing sector.9 Figure 4.1 shows the development of av-
erage log real daily wages for biannual entry cohorts ranging from 1976 to
1996. One can clearly see a rising trend and signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in en-
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9. For data protection reasons, we have added random constant with zero mean to the in-
dividual wage levels.try wages over time. More important, the diﬀerence in entry wages clearly
leads to persistent average-wage diﬀerences across cohorts. However, the
ﬁgure also clearly shows a pattern of reversion. Diﬀerences in initial wages
appear to fade over time.
These patterns are documented explicitly in ﬁgure 4.2, which shows the
annual entry-cohort eﬀects obtained by estimating equation (1) and de-
trending the resulting cohort eﬀects. One can clearly see permanent diﬀer-
ences in average wages of diﬀerent ﬁrm-entry cohorts. Controlling for ob-
servable characteristics reduces the cohort eﬀects only somewhat. This
suggests that when the ﬁrm pays higher wages, it attracts more able work-
ers. However, if we instead control for worker ﬁxed eﬀects, the cohort wage
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Table 4.1 Sample characteristics of stable ﬁrms and displaced workers in West-
German car manufacturing, 1975–2003
A. Basic characteristics of 55 stable and large ﬁrms in car manufacturinga
Average SD Median
Number of cohorts 19.6 4.4 22.0
Employment size 6376.7 9560.8 2161.0
Size of entry cohort 482.3 1678.8 88.0
Average cohort age 39.8 6.3 40.5
Average cohort fraction female 0.11 0.05 0.10
Average cohort years of education 10.50 0.63 10.25
Average cohort starting wage 4.33 0.10 4.31
Average cohort log real daily wage 4.49 0.17 4.49
B. Average characteristics of various samples of displaced workersb
Three, From 55
Years of Job Tenure Prior to Job Loss Three Five Large Stable Firms
Fraction female 0.14 0.14 0.14
Fraction non-German 0.17 0.18 0.21
Years of education 10.45 10.39 10.21
Average age 35.30 37.23 34.40
Average potential experience 18.85 20.84 18.19
Average tenure on lost job 5.57 7.70 3.31
Fraction part-time on lost job 0.03 0.03 0.08
Fraction low-skill blue collar on lost job 0.37 0.38 0.50
Fraction high-skill blue collar on lost job 0.43 0.42 0.49
Fraction low-skill white collar on lost job 0.18 0.18 0.29
Average log real daily starting wage 4.25 4.26 4.25
Average log real daily wage 4.13 4.15 4.28
aStatistics based on ﬁrm-year-cohort observations or averages. Average cohort characteristics
are weighted by cohort size.
bSample only includes observations for workers who moved jobs followed by a spell of thirty
days of unemployment or more at least once. Averages are taken over workers and worker-
years ranging from ﬁve years before to ﬁfteen years after job loss.Fig. 4.1 Average wages by biannual entry cohorts for a single ﬁrm
Note: For data protection reasons, we have added random constant with zero mean to the in-
dividual wage levels.
Fig. 4.2 Firm-entry cohort eﬀects and starting wages for a single ﬁrmdiﬀerences seem to rise, leaving us with no clear conclusion regarding se-
lective entry between cohorts. In either case, we ﬁnd there are robust diﬀer-
ences in average cohort wages over time in this large manufacturing ﬁrm,
as suggested by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994) for a large ﬁnancial
service ﬁrm.
However, contrary to the ﬁnding in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom
(1994), the pattern in the ﬁgure also shows that average cohort diﬀerences
in wages are smaller than diﬀerences in average starting wages between
ﬁrm-entry cohorts. Figure 4.3shows the time pattern of reversion of initial
wage diﬀerences explicitly for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the decay func-
tion. Unlike Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant al-
beit slow decay of initial wage diﬀerences that lasts up to twenty years. Per-
haps not surprisingly, we ﬁnd a concave tenure wage proﬁle (the proﬁle in
Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom’s [1994] ﬁrm was linear). The pattern of de-
cay we ﬁnd is approximately linear.
The key question then is to what extent the result of statistically and nu-
merically signiﬁcant ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects hold for a wider sample of
ﬁrms as well. The answer to this question is aﬃrmative. We ran the model
in equation (1) separately for each ﬁrm in our sample of ﬁfty-ﬁve large and
stable car manufacturing ﬁrms and detrended each set of cohort eﬀects as
described in section 4.3. The distribution of estimated cohort eﬀects for all
ﬁrms is shown in ﬁgures 4.4and 4.6and table 4.2. Figures 4.5and 4.7show
the distribution and the reversion of initial wage diﬀerences.
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Fig. 4.3 Decline in eﬀect of entry wages with tenure at ﬁrmFig. 4.4 Distribution of ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects in diﬀerent years
Fig. 4.5 Distribution of average ﬁrm-entry wages: Diﬀerent yearsTable 4.2 Firm-entry cohort effects and average starting wages in German car
manufacturing, 1975–2003
Without  Controlling for
worker characteristics worker characteristics
(year-group) (year-group)
Percentile 1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s
A. Distribution of ﬁrm-entry cohort effects by decade
10 –0.041 –0.062 –0.059 –0.041 –0.062 –0.059
25 –0.014 –0.030 –0.027 –0.014 –0.030 –0.027
50 0.003 –0.004 –0.003 0.003 –0.004 –0.003
75 0.020 0.022 0.029 0.020 0.022 0.029
90 0.052 0.052 0.067 0.052 0.052 0.067
B. Distribution of average starting wages of ﬁrm-entry cohorts
10 –0.046 –0.115 –0.112 –0.043 –0.094 –0.098
25 –0.019 –0.058 –0.060 –0.017 –0.048 –0.047
50 0.009 –0.014 –0.009 0.005 –0.011 –0.006
75 0.035 0.021 0.035 0.028 0.018 0.029
90 0.079 0.064 0.092 0.062 0.051 0.068
Notes: Distribution of average cohort wages by year-group. All models estimating cohort ef-
fects shown in panel A also include a ﬁrm-speciﬁc quartic tenure proﬁle, ﬁrm-speciﬁc year ef-
fects, and a ﬁrm effects. The resulting ﬁrm-entry cohort effects are detrended. Average start-
ing wages are net of year effects and ﬁrm effects. The observable characteristics in the
right-hand panels are fraction female, fraction non-German, fraction without degree, frac-
tion with apprentice degree, fraction with college degree, fraction low-skilled or high-skilled
blue collar, and fraction low-skilled white collar. All models are weighted by the cohort size.
Fig. 4.6 Percentiles of fraction of initial wage eﬀect decayedOverall, we obtain ﬁve core results:
1. There are signiﬁcant cohort eﬀects for each ﬁrm in the industry we
study that are robust to controls for worker and ﬁrm characteristics. Simi-
lar workers entering ﬁrms at diﬀerent times earn diﬀerent wages.
2. There is considerable heterogeneity of cohort eﬀects between ﬁrms.
The entry cohort eﬀects cannot be simply driven by overall labor market
conditions in the industry.
3. Heterogeneity in cohort eﬀects (both within and between ﬁrms) is in-
creasing over time. The spreading of the German wage distribution occurs
in part through cohort eﬀects.
4. Cohort wage diﬀerences are largest for entry-level wages and con-
verge over time within ﬁrms. However, convergence within ﬁrms is slow,
such that persistent diﬀerences in average wages remain.
5. Reversion of wages is faster the farther average cohort wages are from
the overall market. Outliers tend to convergence between ﬁrms as well.
The distribution of cohort eﬀects with and without worker characteris-
tics is shown in table 4.2 for the full sample and each of the three decades
of our sample. The distribution of F-statistics or p-values is omitted be-
cause all cohort eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent conﬁdence level. The
table also shows the distribution of average entry-level wages with and
without worker controls. The results suggest that there are important and
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in average wages of ﬁrm-entry cohorts that are ro-
bust to controls for average worker characteristics.
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Fig. 4.7 Decay of initial eﬀect by percentile of average starting wageThe typical detrended cohort eﬀect lies within plus and minus 5 percent
of average ﬁrm wages. Taken at face value, they suggest that some cohorts
in some ﬁrms carry premiums or discounts on the order of 5 percent, which
corresponds to the wage eﬀect of about one year of labor market experi-
ence or a year of education in Germany. Given we cannot identify the lin-
ear component of cohort eﬀects, care should be taken with interpreting the
speciﬁc magnitudes.
The average diﬀerences in cohort eﬀects mask even bigger diﬀerences in
average starting wages between cohorts. Comparing ﬁgures 4.4 and 4.5,
one can see that the distribution of deviations of cohorts’ starting wages
from ﬁrm-speciﬁc averages has fatter tails. Again, although most of the
diﬀerences are limited in magnitude, some cohorts experience large diﬀer-
ences in average wages.
The distribution of cohort eﬀect arises from diﬀerences between cohorts
within ﬁrms. However, a large part of the variation arises from variation
between ﬁrms for any given cohort. This is apparent from the fact that it
holds within decades and can be shown to hold within single years as well.
In fact, the annual distribution of cohort eﬀects is similar to the decade-
wide distribution, suggesting that an important part of the variation is
coming from between ﬁrms. Thus, ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects cannot be
simply explained by business-cycle pressures aﬀecting the entire industry.
It may be that within the industry, ﬁrms producing diﬀerent products (say
trucks or passenger cars) or goods of diﬀerent qualities face diﬀerential de-
mand conditions.
In addition, there may be truly ﬁrm-speciﬁc diﬀerences in the evolution
of productivity, employment, and output that aﬀect the fortunes of work-
ers entering ﬁrms at diﬀerent points in time. That similar ﬁrms within sec-
tors can experience vastly heterogeneous patterns of employment growth
has been suggested in the literature before (e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger
1992). Our ﬁndings suggest that such diﬀerences can lead to diﬀerences in
entry-wage levels and average wages between entry cohorts and between
ﬁrms.
Interestingly, the numbers in the tables and ﬁgures suggest that the dis-
tribution of entry wage diﬀerences and cohort eﬀects has been widening
over time. The increasing spread is consistent with a widening in the Ger-
man wage distribution in the 1990s after a period of relative stability. Our
results suggest that part of the recent widening is due to an increasing
spread in entry-wage diﬀerences. However, our results also suggest that
this pattern had already started in the 1980s, something typically not found
in analyses of the overall wage distribution.
Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of the fraction of the initial diﬀerence
in average starting wages decayed at each tenure year. The ﬁgure suggests
ﬁrst, that the median rate of decay is very slow, leading to a half-life at
about eight to nine years. Second, the ﬁgure shows that the speed of decay
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ence fades within three to four years; for the top 10 percent, the eﬀect ac-
tually increases over time. Convergence does not only occur within ﬁrms.
Figure 4.7 shows that cohorts that have high average wages relative to the
overall market have faster speed of convergence. Thus, convergence also
occurs between ﬁrms toward the average wage in the market.
Overall, these results suggest that ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects are a signiﬁ-
cant phenomenon in a broad sample of large and stable manufacturing
ﬁrms even when controlling for worker characteristics. There is substantial
heterogeneity in cohort eﬀects between ﬁrms. Convergence within and be-
tween ﬁrms occurs but is slow. These preliminary estimates suggest that
ﬁrms’ wage structures have a component that systematically varies over
time and diﬀers between ﬁrms. Our documentation of this dynamic com-
ponent complements and extends existing characterizations of static
diﬀerences in average wages, tenure-wage proﬁles, and the variance of
wages (e.g., Abowd and Kramarz 1999; Abowd, Corbel, and Kramarz
1999; Margolis 1995).
These results also underline the importance of eﬀorts to understand the
empirical sources of ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects and their theoretical under-
pinnings. The descriptive results in the previous section allow no clear in-
terpretation with respect to the source of cohort eﬀects. On the one hand,
the fact that initial wage diﬀerences fade suggests that they must have at
least in part been driven by temporary diﬀerences in cohort-speciﬁc rents
or job quality. However, the high degree of persistence does not exclude
that some of the eﬀect is driven by lasting diﬀerences in workers’ skill lev-
els. This underscores the need of an explicit test of potential explanations
that goes beyond purely descriptive study of wage diﬀerences themselves.
4.5.2 Job Losses and Diﬀerences in Starting Wages
As discussed at the outset, if diﬀerences in cohort wages arise due to
diﬀerences in temporary rent or job quality, they should fade if workers
lose their job. Alternatively, if cohorts obtain a diﬀerent degree of training
or experience, they should carry their higher skills over to their new job. As
discussed at the outset, we study this question by comparing the wage
losses of job losers with high or low starting wages at the lost job. The anal-
ysis of losses in cohort eﬀects per se is left for future work with a larger
sample of ﬁrms and workers.
As a ﬁrst step, table 4.3 shows the overall eﬀects of job displacements on
wage changes. The time pattern before and after job loss is shown with stan-
dard error bands in ﬁgure 4.8. The results indicate signiﬁcant and large
wage losses of about 10 percent in the ﬁrst year that fade in about six to
seven years. These results are quite similar to estimates of the eﬀect of job
loss in the United States based on the DWS (e.g., Farber 1997, 2003), and
similar to estimates in Couch (2001) using a similar methodology and the
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wage at lost job
Wage loss by interquartile range
of starting wage of lost job, 
Three years of  Five Years of  Exits from Three years pre-tenure
Year to  pre-job loss pre-job loss large and
job loss tenure tenure stable ﬁrms Low Medium High
–3 0.0043 –0.0002 0.0049 –0.0161 0.0071 0.0188
(0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0157) (0.0048) (0.0039) (0.0046)
–2 0.0053 –0.0087 0.0049 –0.0294 0.0114 0.0366
(0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0244) (0.0063) (0.0058) (0.0062)
–1 0.0031 –0.0221 0.0011 –0.0118 0.0039 0.0221
(0.0080) (0.0083) (0.0336) (0.0082) (0.0078) (0.0082)
0 –0.0331 –0.0624 –0.0313 –0.0378 –0.0372 –0.0192
(0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0430) (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0102)
1 –0.1048 –0.1745 –0.3397 0.0794 –0.1513 –0.2139
(0.0126) (0.0131) (0.0533) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0128)
2 –0.0999 –0.1869 –0.3419 0.0998 –0.1483 –0.2205
(0.0148) (0.0153) (0.0620) (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0146)
3 –0.0938 –0.1919 –0.3468 0.1193 –0.1436 –0.2251
(0.0171) (0.0176) (0.0713) (0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0167)
4 –0.0791 –0.1873 –0.3244 0.1352 –0.1301 –0.2145
(0.0193) (0.0199) (0.0807) (0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0188)
5 –0.0689 –0.1902 –0.3256 0.1517 –0.1218 –0.2112
(0.0216) (0.0223) (0.0901) (0.0210) (0.0208) (0.0210)
6 –0.0596 –0.1890 –0.3048 0.1571 –0.1132 –0.2028
(0.0239) (0.0246) (0.0995) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0231)
7 –0.0515 –0.1909 –0.2867 0.1644 –0.1066 –0.1949
(0.0261) (0.0270) (0.1089) (0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0253)
8 –0.0441 –0.1909 –0.2910 0.1722 –0.1005 –0.1929
(0.0284) (0.0293) (0.1183) (0.0275) (0.0273) (0.0275)
9 –0.0346 –0.1868 –0.2650 0.1728 –0.0929 –0.1820
(0.0307) (0.0316) (0.1278) (0.0297) (0.0295) (0.0297)
10 –0.0212 –0.1843 –0.2602 0.1877 –0.0855 –0.1747
(0.0330) (0.0340) (0.1373) (0.0318) (0.0317) (0.0319)
11 –0.0019 –0.1670 –0.2580 0.2002 –0.0748 –0.1530
(0.0353) (0.0363) (0.1467) (0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0341)
12 0.0164 –0.1562 –0.2317 0.2087 –0.0607 –0.1356
(0.0375) (0.0387) (0.1563) (0.0362) (0.0361) (0.0363)
13 0.0265 –0.1523 –0.2274 0.2163 –0.0566 –0.1266
(0.0398) (0.0410) (0.1657) (0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0385)
14 0.0360 –0.1504 –0.1953 0.2209 –0.0525 –0.1203
(0.0421) (0.0434) (0.1753) (0.0406) (0.0405) (0.0407)
15 0.0449 –0.1495 –0.2034 0.2282 –0.0482 –0.1192
(0.0444) (0.0458) (0.1847) (0.0428) (0.0427) (0.0429)
Constant 3.558 3.595 3.670 3.582
(0.0185) (0.0239) (0.0980) (0.0178)
No. of observations 501,103 284,297 25,059 501,103
R2 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64
Notes: The entries in the tables are coefﬁcient estimates of regressions of log daily real wages on dis-
placement indicators interacted with dummies for years before and after job displacement. The omitted
category are years four and ﬁve before job loss. All models also include individual ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed
effects, and a fourth order polynomial in potential labor market experience. The sample excludes ap-
prentices. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses.German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP). Burda and Mertens (2001) con-
ﬁrm that high-wage job losers in Germany can experience very large and
persistent earnings losses. They also ﬁnd that job losers in the bottom quar-
tile of the wage distribution tend to exhibit signiﬁcant gains from job loss.10
Our estimates are a larger and more persistent than a recent study of
plant closings in Germany using the same administrative data source (Ben-
der et al. 2002). These diﬀerences may arise partly due to diﬀerences in the
deﬁnition of job loss, the estimation methodology, the sample used, and
the time period covered. In particular, because we impose thirty days in un-
employment to identify displaced workers, our approach may lead us to
partially overstate the eﬀect of job displacement. Part of the diﬀerences
may also be due to our focus on workers losing their job in car manufac-
turing. Because the car-manufacturing sector is typically a high-wage sec-
tor, part of the losses we observe are due to losses in the industry wage pre-
mium.
Table 4.3 also shows corresponding estimates for workers that had ﬁve
years of predisplacement tenure and for workers exiting the large and
stable ﬁrms analyzed in the ﬁrst part of the chapter. As expected, higher-
tenure workers experience larger and more persistent wage losses. How-
ever, the wage losses of workers leaving large ﬁrms are much larger. As
found in von Wachter and Bender (2006), workers leaving large ﬁrms per-
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10. Burda and Mertens’ (2001) estimates imply lower increases at the bottom and higher
losses at the top. They do not focus on past starting wages, however, and have a somewhat
diﬀerent deﬁnition of layoﬀ. For the top, they demonstrate that including recalls, as we do
here, may underestimate the eﬀect of job loss.
Fig. 4.8 Wage loss for workers losing jobs in car manufacturingmanently lose rents associated with jobs at large employers and never fully
recover from the initial wage loss.11
The remainder of the section analyzes job displacement eﬀects by previ-
ous starting wages on wage loss and post-loss wage levels. We obtain four
key results:
1. There appears to be mean reversion. In particular, we ﬁnd large
diﬀerences in the degree of wage loss by previous starting wages, with the
bottom gaining and the top losing.
2. There are permanent winners and losers from job loss. Those work-
ers with high past starting wages experience permanent losses, whereas
those with low starting wages experience long-term gains.
3. Pre-job loss starting wage and job tenure have a signiﬁcant positive
impact on wage levels after job loss. As expected, there is positive selection
into high tenure and high past starting wages.
4. The eﬀect of pre-job loss tenure and starting wage partly fades with
time since job loss. These variables appear to serve as initial signal to the
market of worker quality after a job loss.
Table 4.3 and ﬁgure 4.9 show the estimates of percent wages lost at job
loss for workers with high, medium, and low starting wages (based on the
interquartile range of log real starting wages at the previous job). Clearly,
workers in the high and medium starting wage groups suﬀer large and per-
sistent losses and seem to drive the overall eﬀect shown in ﬁgure 4.8.
Thereby, the medium group tends to recover after ten years, whereas work-
ers in the high group suﬀer permanent earnings losses of more than 10 per-
cent. The group of workers with the smallest starting wages, on the other
hand, has substantial beneﬁts from the job loss that increase over time.
These results suggest that starting wages contain ﬁrm-speciﬁc rents that
fade upon job loss. The results also suggest that there is mean reversion in
the labor market. This is consistent with a model of job search in which at
job loss workers come from a diﬀerent part of the wage distribution, but af-
ter job loss they are again reset to the mean of the wage distribution irre-
spective of their previous position. Note that we would not expect to see
the eﬀect of previous wages fade fully, as they are likely to contain some in-
formation on workers’ ability even beyond a person-ﬁxed eﬀect.
4.5.3 The Determinants of Post-Job Loss Wage Levels
To explore this aspect further, table 4.4analyzes the eﬀect of pre-job loss
characteristics on the level of log real wages after job loss. Thereby, the fo-
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11. Large ﬁrms appear to provide an exceptional career environment that is permanently
lost upon job displacement because, on average, workers will transit to a smaller ﬁrm. Von
Wachter and Bender (2006) show that only apprentices who get displaced from large training
ﬁrms suﬀer permanent losses in earnings relative to workers staying at the ﬁrm at the end of
training. Once they control for the change in ﬁrm size at job loss, this excess loss disappears.cus is particularly on the change in the eﬀect of these characteristics over
time, as this may further help discern the sources of persistence in the eﬀect
of initial conditions.
We ﬁrst replicate Kletzer’s (1989) basic model that includes previous job
tenure as basic additional control in a standard human capital model of log
wages. We conﬁrm Kletzer’s result that past job tenure has a positive eﬀect
on current wage levels; in fact, despite the diﬀerent deﬁnition of job loss,
our point estimates are quite similar to hers. As in her case, this suggests
that the positive correlation of tenure and wages not only arises from spe-
ciﬁc skills, but also from the fact that high-tenured workers are likely to be
more able workers. The next column in table 4.4 also adds the log of previ-
ous starting wages to the Kletzer’s regression model. Again, we would 
expect past wages to have a positive eﬀect on current wages as they are a
function of components of workers’ skills not captured by observable
characteristics. This is what we ﬁnd—a 15 percent diﬀerence in starting
wages raises wages past layoﬀ by about 1 percent.
In addition to being correlated with actual worker skills, part of the ini-
tial eﬀect of past job tenure or past wages may be only temporary. To ad-
dress this question, the last two columns of table 4.4 show estimates from
regression models that interact characteristics of the past job with time
since job displacement. Column (3) shows the estimates for past job tenure.
When the interaction with past job loss is included, the initial eﬀect
doubles, and there is a clear pattern of decay. Thus, the estimates in column
(1) capture the average eﬀect of past job tenure all the years prior to job loss
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Fig. 4.9 Wage loss at job loss by starting wage at previous joband obscure the fact that the eﬀect fades over time. However, the eﬀect does
not fade completely even after ten years after job loss, suggesting, perhaps
not surprisingly, that there is still an important correlation between past
job tenure and unobserved worker skill.
A similar pattern holds when past starting wages and their interaction
with time since job loss are included in the model. The eﬀect of past wages
is initially larger and shows a linear pattern of decay (the estimates were not
improved by including interactions with higher order polynomials of time
since displacement). Again, the eﬀect does not completely fade, suggesting
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Table 4.4 Effect of characteristics of lost job on wage levels after job displacement, three years
pre-job loss tenure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log starting wage at lost job (STWAGE) 0.066 0.119
(0.0068) (0.0091)
Years since displacement (YRSINCE) 0.031 0.032 0.063 0.100
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0056)
YRSINCE2 –0.0010 –0.0010 –0.0009 –0.0009
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Tenure on past job (TEN) 0.0119 0.0121 0.0217 0.0223
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0021)
TEN2 –0.00059 –0.00057 –0.00074 –0.00074
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Years of education (ED) 0.043 0.041 0.052 0.048
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Potential labor market experience (EXP) 0.084 0.080 0.082 0.074
(0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0090)
EXP2 –0.00622 –0.00603 –0.00626 –0.00582
(0.00063) (0.00063) (0.00064) (0.00065)
EXP3 0.000184 0.000179 0.000189 0.000179
(0.000019) (0.000019) (0.000019) (0.000019)
EXP4 –0.000002 –0.000002 –0.000002 –0.000002
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
TEN * YRSINCE –0.00127 –0.00129
(0.0001) (0.0001)
ED * YRSINCE –0.00186 –0.00148
(0.0002) (0.0002)
STWAGE * YRSINCE –0.00959
(0.0013)
No. of observations 231,185 231,185 231,185 231,185
R2 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
Notes: The entries in the table are coefﬁcient estimates of regressions of log real daily wages after a job
loss on characteristics of the lost job, year ﬁxed effects, as well as individual characteristics. The speciﬁ-
cations mirror closely that of Kletzer (1989). Regressors not listed in the table are a dummy for female
and non-German, as well as nine dummies for industry, ﬁve dummies for occupation, a dummy for part-
time status, and three dummies for blue- and white-collar status, all pertaining to the lost job. The re-
gressions only include the ﬁrst ten years after a job loss. Apprentices are excluded from the sample. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses.that conditional on observable characteristics past wages do contain infor-
mation on workers’ productivity. However, after ten years, over 80 percent
of the initial eﬀect is gone.
These results appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that the initial
eﬀect of past tenure and past starting wages captures temporary increases
in reservation wages. Over time, reservation wages are determined by cur-
rent market conditions, and the eﬀect of past rents fades. In addition, as
workers continue searching for jobs, their wage is again determined by
their skills and overall wage distribution.
Overall, we ﬁnd that past starting wages contain ﬁrm-speciﬁc compo-
nents of earnings that are partly lost when workers are displaced. These
components may contain both group-level eﬀects, such as ﬁrm-entry co-
hort eﬀects or average ﬁrm-wage premiums, as well as individual-speciﬁc
rents, for example, from job search. In future work, we plan to use dis-
placed workers from a larger sample to distinguish between these diﬀerent
components. We also ﬁnd that not all of the eﬀect of past earnings is lost
immediately. Some of the past wage may aﬀect reservation wages and
search eﬀorts and fades only slowly over time as workers continue to search
for jobs. Concluding, the beneﬁt of getting a high paying job is mostly rel-
egated to that job, but has positive spillover eﬀects to future jobs that per-
sist for up to ten years past a job loss.
4.6 Summary and Conclusion
Persistence of entry conditions within ﬁrms has intrigued economists for
a long time, but few studies were able to provide comprehensive empirical
evidence on the incidence and causes of such cohort eﬀects. In this chap-
ter, we have used administrative information on wages and career patterns
for all workers who ever worked in the German car industry matched to in-
formation on their establishments to make two contributions to the litera-
ture. First, we describe the incidence and size of ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects
for a large sample of ﬁrms. This allows us to study both the heterogeneity
of cohort eﬀects across our industry as well as their persistence both within
and between ﬁrms.
Second, we have begun to analyze the sources of persistent wage diﬀer-
ences between diﬀerent entry cohorts within ﬁrms. In particular, we have
analyzed whether initial wage advantages are lost when workers lose their
job and spend some time in unemployment. If initial wage diﬀerences are
driven by diﬀerences in general human capital, they should persist when
workers are forced to move to new jobs. If they are driven by ﬁrm-speciﬁc
wage components, initial advantages should be lost at a job loss. To probe
the degree of persistence of characteristics on the previous job further, we
also analyzed the eﬀect of past job tenure and previous starting wages on
the level of wages after the job loss.
Do Initial Conditions Persist between Firms? 159We ﬁnd that ﬁrm-entry cohort eﬀects are a common phenomenon
among larger and stable ﬁrms in the German car manufacturing industry.
Similar ﬁrms hiring similar workers at diﬀerent points in time pay them
diﬀerent wages. We also ﬁnd that these diﬀerences are quite heterogeneous
among ﬁrms, such as they cannot be solely explained by marketwide busi-
ness conditions. Initial wage diﬀerences between cohorts do tend to fade
over time within ﬁrms. Similarly, ﬁrms’ wages tend to converge to a market
wage. However, reversion of initial wage diﬀerences occurs slowly.
In the second part, we ﬁnd that initial wage diﬀerences are partly lost at
job loss—high-wage workers have much larger and highly persistent wage
losses. This suggests that wage diﬀerences prior to a job loss are in part
driven by temporary ﬁrm-speciﬁc rents. Part of these rents is likely to con-
sist of ﬁrm-entry cohort diﬀerences, but they may also contain worker-
speciﬁc components such as search rents. We also observe mean reversion,
that is, low-wage workers seem to permanently beneﬁt from job loss. Con-
sistent with the presence of temporary ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage components,
past starting wages have an initial positive eﬀect on wage levels after a job
loss that fades over time. Pre-job loss characteristics appear to aﬀect dis-
placed workers’ reservation wages until their wage is again determined by
their skills and the overall wage distribution.
The results in this chapter highlight several important questions and ar-
eas for future research. First, it will be important to conﬁrm our results
with a wider sample of ﬁrms covering the entire German economy. An ad-
ditional important question for future research is to establish to what ex-
tent worker mobility contributes to the reversion of initial diﬀerences in
wages between entry cohorts. Third, using a larger sample we will be able
to study the eﬀect of exogenous events such as a mass layoﬀ at the estab-
lishment level. Similarly, we will be able to distinguish the loss of group-
speciﬁc rents, such as average ﬁrm wage eﬀects or cohort eﬀects, from the
loss of individual speciﬁc wage components arising among others from job
search.
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